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Abstract: 
In Islamic traditional textbooks modal operators sometimes come 
before propositions, sometimes before the predicates and sometimes at the 
end of propositions. This makes the interpretation of modality in each case 
as de re or de dicto difficult. Given Ibn SςnΪ's discussion of and sensitivity to 
this distinction, in this paper by examining the position of modality in the 
contradictories and converses of modal categorical propositions as well as 
their positions in modal syllogisms I will try to find a reasonable answer to 
this important issue. 
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A-Introduction 
     Let "Wx" stand for "x is a writer", "◊" for "possibly" and "(x)" for 
"every human being". Now let us compare the following two 
sentences: 
1-(x) ◊Wx 
2-◊(x) Wx 
(1) says: Every human being x, possibly (x is a writer). This is a true 
sentence. Every human being can be a writer. 
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(2) says: Possibly every human being x, x is a writer.  According to 
this sentence all human beings can be writers at once. The least can 
be said about the truth of this sentence is that it is doubtful. 
     To the best of my knowledge, in the history of logic it was Ibn SςnΪ 
(980-1037) who for the first time discovered this distinction and in 
KitΪb al-'ibΪra of al-ShifΪ (1, 114-115) and in al-QiyΪs (2, pp.125-150) 
concerning the function of the modal operators in modal sentences 
named cases like (1) and (2) "the mode of predication" (jahat al-haml) 
and "the mode of quantification" (jahat al-sour) respectively. In fact 
(1) and (2) are my symbolizations of the very sentences Ibn SςnΪ 
mentions in KitΪb al-ibΪra. He also observes that (2) implies (1) not 
vice versa. This distinction is now called "de re" and "de dicto" for (1) 
and (2) respectively (see my paper:"Ibn-Sina's Anticipation of the 
Formulas of Buridan and Barcan" 5, pp. 248-255). 
     In the mode of predication modal operators qualify predicates 
containing free variables referring to objects (de re) and in the mode 
of quantification modal operators qualify sentences (de dicto) which 
contain no free variables. This is how this distinction is now defined. 
     Given Ibn SςnΪ's awareness of the sensitivity of the meaning and 
semantics of  modal propositions to the position of modal operators in 
propositions, it is surprising that he carelessly puts modality some 
times at the beginning, some times in the middle and some times at the 
end of a proposition. And our other traditional logicians following him 
also do the same. Of course natural language has a big part in giving 
way to such inaccuracies.  
 
 
B-Modality de re and de dicto  
     When in a traditional logic book by Ibn SςnΪ and his followers we 
read; 
Every A is a B necessarily 
or: 
Every A is necessarily a B 
or: 
Necessarily every A is a B 
 how are we to understand modality? All these forms are frequently 
used interchangeably by traditional logicians and it is within the 
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context of their use that you may find out which of them is meant. To 
see more clearly what the question is about let me translate the 
universal categorical 'every A is a B' into modern symbolism: 
(x)( Ax ŃBx) 
     Here there are three positions for modal operator: before the 
quantifier, after the first 'x' and before the consequent. This analysis of 
the universal categorical was perfectly known to the traditionalist and 
in particular the analysis has the authority of Ibn SςnΪ himself (see my 
paper, 6, pp. 5-19). He even gives the condition under which a 
conditional can be paraphrased as categorical because he also knows 
that not every conditional can be reduced to the universal categorical. 
Here is what he says:  
 
[T]he connective in which the antecedent and the consequent 
share one part can be  reduced to predicative propositions, as when 
you say, "If a line falling on two lines makes the two angles on one 
side so and so, the lines are parallel", this is equivalent in force (fi 
quwwati), to your saying, 
"Every two lines on which another lines falls in such and such 
a way, are parallel". (2, P. 256, 11-15) 
         
     Now given the fact that traditionalists usually put modalities before 
or after propositions it is highly important to know which of the three 
positions they have in mind for the modalities. But before going 
further some points are worth mentioning: 
1-I confine my discussion to alethic modality and mainly universal 
propositions. The result can be easily applied with a few modifications 
to other modalities and propositions. 
2-FΪrΪbς's modality for the subject and Suhrawardς's different 
approach to modality of the predicate, though interesting, are views in 
which I am not interested in this paper which is devoted to the 
common practice of Islamic logicians. 
     Where are we to put modality in the general conditional? There are 
at least three ways to find an answer to this question: we have to 
carefully examine: 
a-the position of modalities in the contradictory of modal 
propositions;  
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b-the position of modalities in the converse of modal propositions; 
c-the position of modalities in the premises of modal syllogisms. 
     As I said before I confine my discussion to alethic universal 
propositions for (a) and (b) and universal and particulars for (c). 
     From the following three forms: 
         
1- Τ(x) (AxŃ Bx) 
2- (x) Τ( AxŃ Bx) 
3- (x) ( AxŃ Τ Bx ) 
 
Here we can dispense with (2).There are no cases of natural language 
propositions syntactically corresponding to (2) in our traditional logic 
texts. Another point is that when modality comes after a proposition, it 
should be taken as qualifying the predicate i.e., (3) (4, P.110): 
                                                                                       
 ﺎﻨﻠﻗ اذا ّﺎﻧﺎﻓ"نﺎﻜﻣﻻﺎﺑ ﺐﺗﺎﻛ نﺎﺴﻧا ّﻞﻛ"ﻨﻌﻤﺑﺒﺴﻧ ّنا ﻲﺔ ﺎﺘﻜﻟاﺔﺑ ﻜﻤﻣ ﺪﺣاو ﺪﺣاو ّﻞﻛ ﻲﻟاﺔﻨ  ﺎﻣﺮﻴﻏ
ﺎﺘﻜﻟا ﻲﻠﻋ ّﻞﻜﻟا عﺎﻤﺘﺟا ّنا ﻲﻋﺪﻧﺔﺑ ﻦﻜﻤﻣ ﺮﻣا .  
 or in translation, 
      When we say: "Every human is a writer by possibility", it means 
that the attribution of writing to every individual [ here every man ] is 
a possibility without claiming that it is possible for all to be writers. 
  
     This clearly shows that when modality comes after a proposition it 
is to be understood as de re modality. In this reading KhВnajς and 
later on KΪtibς, whose book al-RisΪla al-shamsiyya (3) became the text 
book of logic in the madrasas, follow Ibn SςnΪ. 
     Now let us examine the position of modality in three cases (a), (b) 
and (c) mentioned above. 
 
(a)-Contradiction. 
  
The negation of: 
Necessarily every A is B  
or    Every A is B by necessity 
according to all of our logic texts is 
Possibly [in broad sense] some A is not B 
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or    Some A is not B by possibility [in broad sense] 
  
     Here, as you see, the ambiguity is translated into ambiguity. If the 
position of modality in the first sentence is to oscillate between de re 
and de dicto the same is equally the case for its contradictories. 
So both readings are possible as their symbolisms show more clearly: 
                                
de dicto  ŌΤ(x) (Ax Ń Bx) 
◊(Ex) (Ax &  Ō Bx) 
  
de re   Ō (x)(Ax Ń Τ Bx) 
(Ex) (Ax & ◊Ō Bx) 
  
     To sum up, the negation forms of modal propositions and the 
wandering position of modalities in them do not show the logical 
place of modal operators in a proposition.  
 
(b)- Conversion 
 
     According to the traditional logic the converse of a proposition is 
obtained by interchanging the subject term and predicate term while 
retaining the quality and truth of the proposition. So the converse of 
Every A is B by necessity 
becomes: 
Some B is A by actuality (bi al-fiЫl) 
     Here "actuality" refers to the non-emptiness of the extension of the 
subject. In symbolism: 
  
de re  (x) (AxŃΤBx) 
(Ex) Ax  
or 
de dicto Τ(x)(AxŃ Bx) 
(Ex)Ax 
It is an easy exercise to get from both: 
(Ex) ( Bx & Ax) 
Again here we do not know whether the converse is the converse of 
the dere or de dicto proposition. 
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     But there is an interesting case from which a definite conclusion 
can be derived: the converse of the necessary negative universal 
proposition. Ibn SςnΪ and following him Fakhr al-RΪzi, Naģςr al-Dςn 
al-ĤВsς and KΪtibς (in Ĕikamat al-‘ayn) maintain that the converse of:                           
Necessarily no A is B 
is                                             
Necessarily no B is A 
     Here again the modality of the proposition to be converted can be 
taken as de re or de dicto: 
Τ(x) (AxŃŌBx) 
(x) (AxŃΤŌBx) 
But none of them has as the converse the proposition: 
(x) (BxŃΤŌAx) 
And it is only the de dicto one which can be converted to: 
Τ(x) ( BxŃŌAx) 
     So in this case we have no ambiguity. Ibn SςnΪ in this case puts 
modality before the proposition (2, p.95). But here there is a subtle 
point involved. In this de dicto proposition the converse is not really 
converse. It is contrapositive of the proposition. KhВnajς who takes 
modality de re rightly does not accept Ibn SςnΪ's conversion and later 
on KΪtibi too changes his view in al-Shamsiyya (3, 348). This is 
another reason for de re reading of modal propositions.                             
     The difficulty with conversion is that our logicians want the very 
subject terms and predicate terms interchanged without letting 
modality before the predicate terms change its place. That is why 
when modality is taken de dicto the definition seems to work but in de 
re readings it fails. But when we come to possibility cases even the de 
dicto reading fails. Let us see how. Suppose we have the following 
general possible proposition: 
Possibly every A is B 
This can be read as de dicto: 
◊(x)(AxŃBx) 
or as de re: 
(x)(AxŃ◊Bx) 
     The first can not be converted without negating the subject and 
predicate terms. But by definition this is not allowed. The second can 
be converted but only to: 
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(Ex)(Ax&◊Bx) 
But by definition we want it to be: 
(Ex)(Bx&◊Ax) 
 
which is impossible. Here KΪtibς following KhВnajς is right in 
rejecting this conversion. In fact KΪtibς suspends his judgment by 
saying that I have no justification for it (3, p. 359) .  
     Another example closely similar to what just mentioned which 
shows modality in modal propositions is de re is controversies over 
the converse of particular possible positive propositions. If we take 
modality as de dicto then it does have a converse: 
◊(Ex)(Jx&Bx) 
Implies:  
                                                           ◊(Ex)(Bx&Jx) 
But if we take it as de re it does not because: 
(Ex)(Jx&◊Bx) 
does not imply 
(Ex)(Bx&◊Jx) 
 
and KΪtibς here again following KhВnajς is right to reject it (3,p. 359). 
 
 
(c)-Syllogism 
 
     Finaly let us examine the position of modality in syllogisms. One 
of the interesting cases is the first mood of the first figure with 
possible premises. This is Ibn SςnΪ's words: 
ﻪﻨﻣ لوﻻا ﻞﻜﺸﻟا ﻦﻣ لوﻻا بﺮﻀﻟﺎﻓ : ا ج ّﻞﻛ ّنا ﻦﻴﺒﺘﻓ  نﺎﻜﻣﻻﺎﺑ ا ب ّﻞﻛو نﺎﻜﻣﻻﺎﺑ ب ج ّﻞﻛ
نﺎﻜﻣﻻﺎﺑ. 
or in translation: 
One of the first moods of the first figure is: 
Every J is a B possibly, and every B is an A possibly, 
then it is obvious that 
Every J is an A possibly. (2, p. 181) 
     Then he adds that this is a valid (kΪmil) syllogism. Here it is 
obvious that if we take modality de dicto i.e. put it before each of the 
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premises no conclusion in any system of modal logics can be validly 
derived. Here the only position available to the modal operator '◊' is 
before the predicate or equally before the consequent of the 
corresponding conditional. Now we have a derivation which has been 
the centre of controversies. The derivation is carried out in a system 
now called S4.In fact, as I have shown in my paper: "Ibn SςnΪ's 
anticipation of Barcan and Buridan's Formulas"(5) Ibn SςnΪ's modal 
logic is S5. In this derivation, constructed out of his argument, apart 
from an unjustified principle used in line 4 to get line 5, he uses the 
axiom now called the axiom 4 in modern modal logic. He explicitly 
says in different places that the possibly possible is possible (2,  p.183, 
2-3) and this is the principle he uses in the line 7 to get the line 8 of 
the following proof: 
 
1- (x)(AxŃ ◊Bx)  Assumption 
2- (x) (BxŃ ◊Cx) Assumption 
3- AxŃ◊Bx   2,UE 
4- BXŃ◊Cx   3,UE 
5- ◊BxŃ◊◊CX  ? 
6- AxŃ◊◊Cx   1, 5, PL 
7- ◊◊CxŃ◊Cx  6, Axiom4 
8- AxŃ◊Cx   6, 7 PL 
9- (x) (AxŃ◊Cx)  8, UI 
 
     Whether this modal syllogism and those like it with two possibility 
premises are valid or justified is not my concern in this paper. One can 
see Paul Thom and Tony Street's papers on this subject (8). Here I 
only mention in passing that KhВnajς and following him KΪtibς and in 
fact many other traditional logicians were right to reject such modal 
syllogisms as invalid. And it seems to me that Paul Thom's embedding 
such de re modality within a de dicto necessity modality, though very 
interesting, has no textual support. Also Tony Street's interpretation of 
modality in the manner of Suhrawardς's Philosophy of Illumination is 
misleading. There is a great difference between taking modality as a 
sentence operator and taking it, like Suhrawardς, as a part of predicate. 
Suhrawardς's view should not be attributed to Ibn SςnΪ and his 
followers.  
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Conclusion 
      What emerges from my discussion in this paper is the fact that in 
all modal syllogisms, valid or invalid, modality qualifies predicates 
i.e., it is modality de re. In fact, apart from certain few cases where 
Ibn SςnΪ and following him other logicians use de re/de dicto 
distinction to show the difference of meaning between certain 
propositions, in almost all other cases they take all modalities as de re. 
In fact according to Ibn SςnΪ: 
[T]he proper place for a modal word is 
to attach to the copula; this is so because 
it generally qualifies the relation of the 
predicates to the subject (1, 114-115). 
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